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What 4 03300 Is
Julian Dodd
The University of Manchester
ABSTRACT
What is John Cage’s 4 03300? This paper disambiguates this question into three sub-
questions concerning, respectively, the work’s ontological nature, the art form to
which it belongs, and the genre it is in. We shall see that the work’s performances
consist of silence (rather than containing environmental sounds), that it is a work of
performance art (rather than music), and that it belongs to the genre of conceptual
art. Seeing the work in these ways helps us to understand it better, and promises to
assuage somewhat the puzzlement and irritation of those who are at first resistant to
its charms.
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1. Introduction
On August 29, 1952, at the Maverick Concert Hall in Woodstock, New York, David
Tudor sat down at the piano, closed its lid over its keys, and looked at a stopwatch.
After thirty seconds had elapsed, he raised the piano lid and lowered it again, repeating
these actions after a further two minutes and twenty-three seconds. After another one
minute and forty seconds had passed, Tudor raised the piano’s lid for a final time, and
then stood up to receive applause. His performance was over.1
Famously—notoriously, some would say—Tudor had just premiered John Cage’s
4 03300. The best known, so-called ‘tacet’, edition of the work’s score is pleasingly easy to
follow, even for those with a minimal grasp of musical notation: on a single sheet, the
work’s three movements are numbered, and beneath each number there just occurs the
word ‘tacet’. At the bottom of the page, Cage [1960] explains that ‘[t]he title of this
work is the total length in minutes and seconds of its performance.… However, the
work may be performed by any instrumentalist or combination of instrumentalists and
last any length of time.’2
Decades on from the work’s premiere, we have a pretty good idea of what 4 03300 is
about. It seems that Cage’s main aim for the piece was for its performance to prompt
audiences to attend to the kinds of environmental sounds normally regarded as
1 Here I take Kyle Gann’s [2010: 2–3] word for what happened.
2 Cage’s stipulation in the ‘tacet’ score that performances of different lengths should have different titles is just
his vivid way of making the point that properly formed performances of the work can vary in their temporal
extent. Contrary to Gann’s suggestion [2010: 185], it does not imply that each such performance is a performance
of a new piece. (In what follows, I abide by convention and call the work ‘4 03300 ’, while recognizing that a perfor-
mance of it can last any length of time.)
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ambient in performance environments: that is to say, the kinds of sounds that, if they
occur during the performance of a conventional piece of music, are regarded as dis-
tracting and irrelevant to the work performed.3 Cage wanted to remind us of the ubiq-
uity of such sounds and, as he put it, nudge audience members towards appreciating
them as ‘just sounds’, ‘liberat[ing] [these sounds] from abstract ideas and … let[ting]
them be physically uniquely themselves’ (quoted in Griffiths [1981: 124]). When we lis-
ten to sounds in this way, we supposedly hear the sounds ‘as such’ [Carroll 1994: 93],
‘for the pure sounds they are’ [Kania 2010: 348].4 Such an appreciation of sounds as
sounds reveals what Stephen Davies [1997: 451] calls their ‘naked aesthetic properties’.
These are those properties that a sound reveals to someone when she attends to its
auditory appearance without bringing to bear artistic concepts (such as ‘music’, ‘pitch’,
‘melody’, or, indeed, ‘art’).
Cage also had two subsidiary aims for 4 03300. First, he wanted to compose a work
from which all traces of his ego were removed. He had long been interested in using
chance procedures in composition in order to avoid prescribing what the sonic profile
of a work’s performance should be. For example, in Imaginary Landscape No. 4 (1951),
a piece for pairs of performers at twelve radios, Cage’s score directs the performers to
manipulate the volume and tuning controls in certain specific ways, thereby enabling
the sonic profile of a performance to be influenced by matters beyond his control. In
effect, the score for Imaginary Landscape No. 4 instructs the performers to use their
radios to collect sounds and, as an ensemble, combine them into a complex sound
sequence; but these instructions are essentially indirect, specifying only the procedures
for finding and giving some structure to these sounds, not the resultant sound sequen-
ce’s auditory appearance.
4 03300 is designed to annihilate even this attenuated level of authorial control over
the sounds its performances draw our attention to. Its performers do not follow proce-
dures of any kind for giving structure to the sounds that occur within their performan-
ce’s temporal boundaries [S. Davies 1997: 458]; Cage just directs them to remain silent,
with a view to prompting their audience to attend to whatever sounds take place
around them. It is this ultimate ceding of control over the sounds that the audience
attends to that Cage was aiming for in 4 03300, and his achievement of this was some-
thing that he himself found valuable in the piece.5
Second, in encouraging audiences to appreciate aesthetically what he called ‘acciden-
tal sounds’ [Kostelanetz 1988: 65], Cage hoped to bring them to see the limitations
inherent in traditional—and, as he would claim, overly egotistical—musical works. His
hope was that people would move on from listening to Bach, Beethoven, and the rest to
listening to ordinary, uncomposed, undomesticated sounds. This explains why it is
3 My use of ‘environmental sounds’ here encompasses sounds such as the sound of rainfall, or of air condition-
ing, traffic noise from outside the auditorium, and noises made by audience members.
4 As Cage himself puts it, controversially, ‘there’s no such thing as silence. What [the audience] thought was
silence, because they didn’t know how to listen, was full of accidental sounds. You could hear the wind stirring
outside during the first movement. During the second, raindrops began pattering the roof, and during the third
the people themselves made all kinds of interesting sounds as they talked or walked out’ [Kostelanetz 1988: 65].
As Roy Sorensen [2009: 144] observes, the first sentence of this quotation is false: where there are no sound
waves, there are no sounds; so the vast majority of the universe, since it contains no sound waves, is silent.
Despite this, what Cage says here describes nicely what I take the central point of 4 03300 to be.
5 ‘I think perhaps my own best piece, at least the one I like the most, is the silent piece … I wanted my work to
be free of my own likes and dislikes, because I think music should be free of the feelings and ideas of the com-
poser’ (Cage, quoted in Kostelanetz [1988: 188]).
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important that performances of 4 03300 take place in settings usually reserved for per-
formances of traditional works of music: the attuned audience member is supposed to
realize that the sounds Cage is interested in are intended by him to take the place of the
sounds constitutive of performances of traditional works of music.6
Let us return to the work’s main aim: that of bringing to our attention, and thereby
enabling us to aesthetically appreciate, the kinds of sounds that are normally regarded
as ambient in performance settings. How does a performance of 4 03300 accomplish this?
Here the metaphor of framing is helpful, although, as we shall see in section 3, it soon
demands further elaboration and disambiguation. For now, though, we can just say
this: in a similar way to that in which a picture frame draws our attention to what lies
within it, the pianist’s silence and aforementioned actions function as a ‘notational
device’ [Carroll 1994: 94] by jointly compelling the audience—‘by subtraction, so to
speak’ [ibid.]—to attend to those environmental sounds occurring as the performance
unfolds. The pianist’s performance, in effect, encloses these sounds within the audien-
ce’s collective attention (Gann 2010: 11]. To cash the metaphor somewhat, the relevant
gestures, inactivity, and silence, within a setting in which the performance of traditional
works of music is standard, render the audience unusually conscious of, and sensitive
to, the environmental sounds occurring during the work’s performance; and this, if
things go well, opens the door to their appreciating these sounds aesthetically, although
not artistically.
Tellingly, 4 03300 has received mixed reviews over the years. As Cage himself testifies,
its initial reception was characterised by puzzlement and irritation,7 and the outrage—
or, at least, bewilderment—does not seem to have substantially abated.8 Indeed, when
BBC television broadcast an orchestral performance of the piece from the Royal Albert
Hall in 2012, the work was described on the corporation’s website as ‘absolutely ridicu-
lous’, ‘a gimmick’, ‘stupid’, and ‘the Emperor’s new clothes’ by vexed licence fee payers
[Gann 2010: 15]. My suggestion is that some of this ire is generated by a misunder-
standing of what sort of thing 4 03300 is. Coming to the work under a misapprehension
as to its nature, auditors tend to misunderstand it and, as a consequence, fail to see the
value in it. If I am right, determining what kind of thing 4 03300 is, besides being philo-
sophically valuable for its own sake, will enable us to see this work aright, and thereby
appreciate it for the delightful work that it is.
2. Questions and Spoilers
What sort of thing is 4 03300? We know already, merely by reading Cage’s words at the
bottom of the work’s ‘tacet’ score, that it is a work for performance. But what sort of
thing is it? At once, this question requires disambiguation. One thing we might be using
these words to ask is what the work’s ontological nature is. If it is this that we are inter-
ested in, then we will expect a complete answer to involve the assignment of 4 03300 to
6 ‘I said that the purpose of this purposeless music would be achieved if people learned to listen; that when they
listened they might discover that they preferred the sounds of everyday life to the ones they would presently hear
in the musical program; that that was alright as far as I was concerned’ (Cage, quoted in [Griffiths 1981: 124]).
7 Rather sadly, Cage says this: ‘I had friends whose friendship I valued, and whose friendship I lost because of
that. They thought that calling something you hadn’t done, so to speak, music, was a form of pulling the wool
over their eyes, I guess’ (quoted in Gann [2010: 4]).
8 ‘They didn’t laugh’, Cage continues, ‘they were irritated when they realized nothing was going to happen, and
they haven’t forgotten it thirty years later: they’re still angry’ (quoted in [Gann 2010: 4]).
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an ontological category, along with some further explanation of what the work is like
and how it differs from other candidate entities with which we might have been
tempted to identify it.
However, in asking what sort of thing 4 03300 is, we might be asking what art kinds
the work falls under. If it is this that interests us, then we will want to know what art
form the work is a member of and what genre it exemplifies. Art forms—such as music,
literature, and painting—are artistic categories that explain why works of that kind are
produced by working (in certain ways) with certain artistic media, and not others
[Lopes 2007: 247]. Vermeer used brushstrokes to work with paint on canvas, rather
than manipulating iron, bronze, or marble, to produce Girl with a Pearl Earring
because he was producing a painting, not a sculpture; Philip Roth used words to pro-
duce a text, rather than paint-loaded brushstrokes on canvas, to produce American Pas-
toral because he was producing a novel, not a painting. Art forms are not cross-media;
they are ways of manipulating certain media, and are hence tied to those media.
Genres, by contrast, are artistic categories—such as tragedy, comedy, noir, and
satire—that group together works, not according to the media that these works are in
(and how they are used), but according to certain of the purposes with which these
works were produced. More precisely [Abell 2015: 32],
a genre is a category of works determined by the purpose for which they are produced and
appreciated, where the means by which they pursue that purpose rely at least partly on pro-
ducers’ and audiences’ common knowledge that the works are produced and to be appreciated
for that purpose.
Some Like It Hot, for example, is a comedy because it is intended to be found funny at
least partly as a result of the film’s makers and its audiences having common knowledge
that it aspires to this very purpose (where such common knowledge consists, not
merely in the fact that both its makers and its audiences are aware of this purpose, but
that each group is aware of the other’s awareness of it). Part of the reason why the film
achieves its comic purpose is that its audiences know that it is supposed to make them
laugh, and will therefore see the funny side of situations that they might otherwise take
more seriously, and because the film’s producers know that its audiences will do this,
and ‘can thus exploit the comic potential of subjects, situations, or actions that might
otherwise seem tragic, or mundane, or offensive’ [ibid.: 32–3].
Crucially, for our purposes, genres differ from art forms in the way in which they are
related to artistic media. While art forms group together works according to the media
they are in, genres do not. Genres, unlike art forms, can be cross-media. Novels and
films can be noirs; films, plays, and graphic novels can be tragedies; and so on. Merely
assigning a work to a genre does not in itself determine the media used in its
production.
Having disambiguated our question into the ontological question, the art form ques-
tion, and the genre question, I shall now let slip some spoilers by briefly describing the
respective answers to be defended in the remainder of this paper. 4 03300 is a type whose
tokens are performances in which its performers are silent (as opposed to being a type
whose tokens are performances comprising the sounds audible during these perform-
ances); it is not a work of music, but a work of performance art; and it belongs to the
genre of conceptual art. These latter two assignments, in particular, are key in giving us
the materials with which to potentially defuse much of the hostility that 4 03300 has
aroused.
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3. The Ontological Question
4 03300 is a repeatable work for performance: a work that admits of multiple performance
‘by any instrumentalist or combination of instrumentalists’ [Cage 1960]. In what fol-
lows, I adopt the hegemonic conception of the ontological nature of such repeatable
artworks, presuming such works to be types of some kind. Even with this assumption
in place, however, a substantial ontological matter remains unresolved: what sort of
type is 4 03300?
The literature would seem to suggest two options here. On the one hand, we might
regard 4 03300 as a literally silent work, as Cage’s talk of his ‘silent piece’ suggests [Koste-
lanetz 1988: 188]. On this view—assumed, rather than argued for, by Roy Sorensen
[2009: 142–3]—the work is a type tokened by performances in which musicians follow
Cage’s instructions to remain silent. The environmental sounds within the audience’s
earshot during a performance, although framed by that performance, do not belong to
it; they occur as the performance takes place.9 Call the work, thus construed, the silent
work or, for short, S.
The standard view among philosophers and musicologists, however, is that 4 03300 is not
S, but is what I shall call the sonically replete work [S. Davies 1997: 448–9; Kania 2010:
345–8]. According to this alternative ontological proposal, the work is a type whose tokens
include within themselves the very sounds that they frame. Consequently, on this second
view, the analogy between a performance of the work and a picture frame becomes alto-
gether more precise. Specifically, the performer is akin to an artist who presents an empty
picture frame and specifies that her artwork is whatever can be seen through it [S. Davies
1997: 459]. Analogously, if the work is sonically replete, then the sounds occurring as a
performance of 4 03300 take place belong to the performance as its content.10
Let us call the work, thought of in this alternative way, R; and, to highlight the more
exact analogy obtaining between a performance of R and a picture frame, let us say that
such a performance does not just frame environmental sounds (as a performance of S
does), but p-frames them: that is, frames them by encompassing them within its con-
tent. It is a commonplace to point out that performances of 4 03300 frame environmental
sounds, but saying that performances p-frame such sounds is not philosophically inno-
cent, since doing so would commit us to taking 4 03300 to be R, not S.
So, is 4 03300 S or R? I think that it is S, but, before I get on to justifying this heterodox
interpretation, let me say three things to clarify what I mean by ‘silence’, thereby clear-
ing away potential misunderstandings concerning my eventual construal of 4 03300 as
the silent work. In the next three paragraphs I shamelessly piggyback on observations
made by Sorensen [2009].
First, I regard the token performances of the work as silences on the part of individ-
ual musicians (or collective such silences, if we are dealing with ensemble performan-
ces). This way of putting it respects a couple of important features of silence. Silences
are of things, in the sense of being ontologically dependent upon them: they are not
free floating. Relatedly, the silence of something—whether of a person, a place, a
9 ‘Of course, there was the usual coughing and shuffling plus noises that wafted in from outside. But the audi-
ence did not count these sounds as part of the performance, just as these sounds do not count as part of the per-
formance in the case of conventional music’ [Sorensen 2009: 142–3].
10 For reasons that need not detain us right now, Andrew Kania believes that some performances of 4 03300 might
exclude certain occurrent sounds [2010: 346–8], but his view is certainly akin to Davies’s in so far as it takes the
sounds framed by a performance to belong to that performance.
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situation, a process, or an orchestra—is located roughly where the entity whose silence
it is is located. It is present where the thing’s sounds would have been [ibid.: 139]. These
two facts explain how there may be silence in the presence of sound. I may be silent in
an otherwise noisy environment, such as when I noiselessly contemplate my team’s
poor performance as I watch a football match; and when it was performing 4 03300 in
the Royal Albert Hall in 2012, The BBC Symphony Orchestra was silent on stage,
although the auditorium hosted sounds of various kinds.
The second feature of silence that I want to stress is that it can genuinely be heard
[ibid.: 126–32]. We do not just hear sounds; we hear silence, the absence of sounds. True
enough, there is no auditory sensation of silence [ibid.: 131]; but we can nonetheless
hear a period of silence between sounds. When, in the middle of the night, a burglar
alarm is finally switched off after ringing for hours, we hear the silence and luxuriate in
it as we fall asleep. The silence that we hear is not represented by any sensation.
The third and final thing I want to say about silence is that, in normal contexts (such
as those in which we describe performers while they perform 4 03300), what counts as
silent is something short of an absolute absence of sound, just as what counts as a
straight line in nature is some way short of what would count as such in a geometry
class [ibid.: 142–4]. Given this fact, it can be literally true that a musician performing
4 03300 is silent, even though her blood in circulation makes a very quiet noise.
When I say that 4 03300 is S, a work whose tokens are silent performances by musi-
cians, I thus claim that these silent performances are ontologically dependent upon the
musicians concerned, that they are located roughly where the said musicians are
located, that they can be heard by audiences, and that they count as silences according
to our customary, less-than-the-strictest, standards. Thus construed, such silences can
be unproblematically experienced, not just in concert halls when 4 03300 is being per-
formed, but in the countryside at the dead of night, in examination halls, and in per-
formances of plays by Harold Pinter.
Now that we have cleared up the nature of the claim that 4 03300 is a silent work, why
should we prefer it to a conception of the work as sonically replete? I shall get on to
this presently, but first of all, in order to reassure readers familiar with Davies’s dis-
missal of my preferred ontological proposal, let me explain why he is wrong to think
that Cage clearly committed himself to the work’s being R, rather than S.
Davies asserts that there is ‘no doubt’ that Cage intended 4 03300 as R, rather than S [S.
Davies 1997: 448–9]; but he is wrong about this. The evidence he provides for this bold
claim is Cage’s description of the piece as ‘becom[ing] in performance the sounds of
the environment’ [Kostelanetz 1988: 188]. But these words are far from conclusive,
since they are, perhaps, better interpreted as loose talk from a non-philosopher keener
to convey the work’s point—namely, bringing the audience to attend to the kinds of
environmental sounds customarily ignored in performance environments—than to put
his finger on the work’s ontological nature. And, in any case, Cage calls 4 03300 his ‘silent
piece’ [ibid.] and, as Davies himself admits, also says that he wanted to compose a piece
of silence [S. Davies 1997: 454]. Perhaps, too, Cage’s claim that there is ‘no such thing
as silence’ expresses some awareness, albeit dim, of the distinction between silence in
the everyday sense and silence according to the very strictest standards. In other words,
Cage might have wanted performances of 4 03300 that are silent in a less strict sense to
bring audiences to appreciate what he took to be the impossibility of there being silence
according to the strictest of standards. (This last modal claim of his is false, of course,
but he was evidently unaware of this fact.)
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So, Cage’s own testimony about 4 03300 does not commit him to thinking of it as R,
rather than S. But in addition to this, we should also bear in mind that, contrary to
what Davies says, identifying the work with S is compatible with its being able to
achieve what Cage intended for it. Davies thinks that if we take the work to be silent,
then the environmental sounds heard during a performance become ‘irrelevant to, and
distractions from, the work’ [ibid.: 448]. Obviously, if this were so, then Cage’s aim of
drawing our attention to such sounds would be stymied. If the audience were to regard
the environmental sounds occurring during a performance of the piece as distractions
from, and irrelevant to, the performance—as they would, if such sounds occurred dur-
ing a performance of a symphony or string quartet—then they would try to ignore
them in order to focus on the silent performance of the musicians, not take up the invi-
tation to attend to these sounds, as Cage wants them to do. But, in fact, identifying
4 03300 with S does not have this troublesome implication. While listeners new to the
piece might, for a very short while, try to pay close attention to the performance’s con-
tent, they will soon discern that, since this content consists in silence, there is nothing
there that rewards such attention. And it is just this realization that will prompt them
to direct their focus onto things outwith the performance’s content: the sounds occur-
ring around them. These environmental sounds do not, then, distract our attention
from the performance’s content; on the contrary, this content, once grasped, compels
us to look beyond itself, to the sounds of the environment, for aesthetic interest.
Cage was very keen to make the point that a performance of 4 03300 will ‘accept ambi-
ent sounds and not be interrupted thereby’ [Kostelanetz 1988: 210]. But here, too, we
can do justice to the literal content at which Cage is gesturing without thereby commit-
ting ourselves to the idea that these sounds literally become parts of the performance: in
other words, without having to say that these sounds are p-framed, rather than simply
framed. For the substantial claim beneath the figurative talk of a performance’s ‘accept-
ing’ environmental sounds is just the fact that I elucidated in the previous paragraph:
namely, that these environmental sounds are not noises competing for our attention
with the performance, but are instead the things the performance directs our attention
towards. This being so, it follows that these sounds do not interrupt the performance,
but form its subject matter. They are things that the performance is about, rather than
things entering into its being. No commitment to the work’s being R is required.
So, treating 4 03300 as S is no less compatible with what Cage says than is identifying it with
R; and doing so coheres equally well with what Cage intended for the work. But are there any
positive reasons for preferring the ontological proposal that the work is S? Yes. Two.
First, only if we treat 4 03300 as the silent work can we acknowledge that it is a work
for performance by musicians, as Cage says it is. As we noted in section 1, the score of
4 03300 states that it ‘may be performed by any instrumentalist or combination of instru-
mentalists’ [Cage 1960]: that is to say, Cage makes it clear that the work’s tokens are
performances by the musicians on stage.11 However, if the work were R, this could not
be true: its tokens could not be performances. Here is why.
11 Here I take Cage at his word that 4 03300 is a work for performance by musicians. I am justified in doing so
because this much is stated by Cage in his scored instructions for instancing the piece, and because convention
has it that we interpret scored instructions literally and treat them as authoritative. This marks a clear contrast
between what Cage says here and other remarks by him that I have read less literally or taken with a pinch of
salt. These other remarks, since they are statements of his about the work, rather than scored instructions, lack
the authoritative status of the latter.
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If 4 03300 is R, and the sounds occurring within a token’s temporal boundaries actu-
ally belong to it, then it follows that this token comprises sounds that are neither pro-
duced, nor combined, nor in any way structured by the work’s performers: the
musicians on stage who follow Cage’s scored instructions for instantiating the work.
But if this is right, then the sounds forming the content of the token are not performed
sounds; and, in turn, if this right, then the token is not, properly speaking, a perfor-
mance at all, but a mere aggregation of sounds that unfolds as the musicians are silent.
The principle at work in what I have just said is this: a work-token comprising sounds
is a performance of that work only if these sounds are performed sounds in the sense
just introduced. Since tokens of R fail to meet this condition, 4 03300, if R, is not tokened
by performances, and so is not itself a work for performance. Given what Cage says
about 4 03300, this is a reductio of the proposal that 4 03300 is R.
Compare this sorry state of affairs with what transpires if we take 4 03300 to be S. If
4 03300 is the silent work, then it is plainly a work for performance. Qua S, the work is a
type whose tokens are performances by musicians in which they follow Cage’s instruc-
tions by keeping silent. The musicians genuinely perform the work by doing precisely
what Cage says they should do in order to perform it.
Coupled with this reason to prefer the treatment of 4 03300 as S is another, this time to
do with the work’s aim of getting its audiences to appreciate the sounds framed by a
performance as pure sounds. As we saw in section 1, the audience is supposed to appre-
ciate the sounds that they hear during a performance for the pure sounds they are,
without bringing them under artistic concepts. If, however, 4 03300 were R, this ambition
would be severely compromised. For if 4 03300 were R, then an understanding listener
would know this: she would hear the sounds as belonging to the performance and, in
so doing, would hear them as constituents of an artistic enterprise. She could not help
but listen to them, not as undomesticated environmental sounds, but rather as items
elevated to the status of art [Carroll 1994: 95–6].
Identifying 4 03300 with S avoids this problem. The environmental sounds framed by
a performance do not belong to that performance: although these sounds are framed
by a work of art, they are not p-framed by one. So, at the same time as appreciating the
performance of the musicians as artistic, the audience can appreciate the environmental
sounds that this performance draws our attention to for the naked, non-artistic, sounds
that they are.
To sum up, the hegemonic ontological proposal for 4 03300—the thesis that the work
is sonically replete—is incorrect. Nothing that Cage says about the work, or intends it
to do, favours this proposal over the rival proposal that takes the work to be silent. Fur-
thermore, there are two powerful reasons for giving the work what we may dub ‘the
silent treatment’. In short, 4 03300 is not R; it is S.
4. The Art Form Question
Art forms, we agreed in section 1, are artistic categories that group works together accord-
ing to which media were used to produce them and how these media were worked in
doing so. Unlike genres, art forms are tied to certain artistic media. So, to what art form
does 4 03300 belong? The obvious answer is: music. Performances of 4 03300 are by musicians
and occur in venues in which musical works are performed; the piece is often performed
in programmes alongside performances of traditional musical works; the work’s score can
be bought from music shops; and Cage, after all, undoubtedly composed some works of
music. In this section I shall explain why this prima facie answer is wrong.
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Composers compose repeatable works of music by working with—that is to say,
organizing—sound. Here I agree with both Levinson and Davies that a work’s being
organized sound is a necessary condition for its being a work of music [S. Davies 1997:
456–7; Levinson 1990: 270n3]. The composer of a repeatable work of music organizes
sound by specifying, typically in a score, what performers should do to produce a
sound-event that is a properly formed performance of the work. Consequently, the per-
formers, in performing such a work, collectively construct a complex sound sequence,
and, since they do this by carrying out the composer’s instructions, the composer, via
the performers’ actions, counts as organizing these sounds himself.
4 03300 is a repeatable work. So, did Cage organize sound in writing 4 03300? No, but the
reason why not will depend on the answer we give to the ontological question. If, as I
have recommended, 4 03300 is S, the silent work, then the reason why the work cannot
be organized sound is obvious. 4 03300 cannot be organized sound because its perform-
ances are periods of silence on the part of the performers, not sound-events: these per-
formances do not contain sounds within their content, organized or not. But what if
someone were to resist this minority ontological proposal, preferring to follow philo-
sophical orthodoxy in taking 4 03300 to be the sonically replete work, R? If the work is R,
then a performance of it p-frames the sounds that occur within its temporal bound-
aries: it includes these sounds as its content. So, if we are to establish the conclusion
that 4 03300 is not music, even when construed as R, we must explain why a performance
of the work, thus construed, nevertheless falls short of organizing the environmental
sounds that make up its content.
For a performance of R to p-frame the environmental sounds that it frames—that is,
to include these sounds within its content—is for the performance to appropriate these
sounds. This is all that ‘appropriation’ can mean in this context. Andrew Kania [2010:
346] thinks that explaining why a performer of R does not organize these sounds would
have to amount to explaining why they are not appropriated by her; and, quite rightly
(since a performance of R, in p-framing the said sounds, thereby appropriates them),
he goes on to express a healthy scepticism about whether this can be done.
However, appropriation is not the crux of the issue here, since merely appropriating
sounds is insufficient for organizing them. To see this, imagine a variant of Imaginary
Landscape No. 4: Simple Imaginary Landscape. This work is for a single performer, who
manipulates a radio—automatically tuned to a certain frequency and set to a certain
volume—by simply turning it on for a set period of time. Imagine, further, that, as luck
would have it, the volume of the radio is set so that the sounds emitted by the radio
happen to exactly match, in all audible respects, the sounds produced at the transmit-
ting source. All of this ensures that the performer of Simple Imaginary Landscape uses
her radio to appropriate, with perfect and astonishing accuracy, the source sounds.
Will she thereby count as having organized these sounds?
I think not, and this for the reason that merely presenting a group of things as they
are is not to organize them. (I do not organize my wardrobe by just opening the door
and pointing to what is inside.) Organizing sounds is a matter of either producing a
structured sound sequence (as performers of traditional works of music do), or else giv-
ing some structure to appropriated sounds (as the performers of Imaginary Landscape
No. 4 do). But such structuring of the sounds by the performer is precisely what is
absent in the case of a performance of Simple Imaginary Landscape. She is a mere
cipher of sound. From this it follows that, even if we were happy to describe the framing
of sounds by a performance of 4 03300 as the appropriation of these sounds, this would
not entail that the framed sounds had been organized by its performer or performers.
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So why, even if 4 03300 is R, does it not count as organized sound, and hence as music?
For the same reason that Simple Imaginary Landscape doesn’t. By contrast with Imagi-
nary Landscape No. 4, neither 4 03300, nor Simple Imaginary Landscape, involves its per-
formers in giving any structure to the sounds they frame. A performer of Simple
Imaginary Landscape merely presents—without shaping, combining, or otherwise
structuring—the sounds she appropriates. Performers of 4 03300, meanwhile, follow
Cage’s instructions in doing nothing to intervene in any way in the unfolding of the
complex sound sequences that take place within their performances’ temporal bound-
aries. Consider, once more, Cage’s account of the premiere of 4 03300: the sound of the
wind blowing and that of the rain pattering on the roof are environmental sounds that
would have occurred as they did anyway, even if Tudor had not been premiering 4 03300;
and while the same is not true of sounds made by audience members in responding to
the work’s performance (such as the sounds made by people walking out in protest), it
remains the case that Tudor just let these sounds happen. It is the fact that performers
of 4 03300 withhold from giving any structure to the sounds that occur during their per-
formance, rather than any fact explicated by the concept of appropriation, that explains
why they do not count as organizing these sounds.12
So, 4 03300 is not itself a work of music, since its performers do not organize sounds.
What art form does it belong to, then? Davies is right to describe the work as ‘an exam-
ple of performance art’ [S. Davies 1997: 461], since it is altogether more illuminating to
place it alongside other performance artworks, such as Vito Acconci’s Following Piece
and Carolee Schneemann’s Interior Scroll.13 In this respect, it is significant that Allan
Kaprow, the originator of ‘the happening’, was one of Cage’s students. So, my positive
proposal is this. While 4 03300 is certainly about music (among other things), and while
it is essential that the work’s performers are musicians (since its ironic effect trades on
this [ibid.: 455–6]), it is, in fact, a repeatable work of performance art: a kind of multi-
ply performable happening [ibid.: 460].14 Since the happening is usually seen as a crea-
ture of the 1960s, we could on this basis describe the work as being at least ten years
ahead of its time.15
12 It is, of course, true that a performance of the work obeying Cage’s score will be divided into three movements.
Does this not structure the sounds taking place by splitting them into three distinct stretches? No. The sounds
themselves are not given any structure by a performance of the work being divided in this way. The three move-
ments constitute three temporally extended acts of drawing the audience’s attention to the sounds occurring
around them: to, in this way, switch in and out of pointing to whatever sounds occur is not to give these sounds
structure; it is not to do anything to or with them. (An analogy might help. A football match is divided in two by
the half-time interval; the match itself—as opposed to my experience of it—does not have an additional interval
if I cease to pay attention to it for five minutes.)
13 I resist adopting Kania’s suggestion that 4 03300 is a work of non-musical sound art [2010: 348–9]. First, our
understanding of this (putative) category of art is as yet fairly dim; second, and more significantly, insofar as works
of non-musical sound art are ‘sonic artworks’ [S. Davies 2012: 553n3], assigning 4 03300 to this category would seem
to require us to view 4 03300 as itself a sonic artwork: i.e. as R, rather than as S.
14 Exactly like Interior Scroll, in other words. According to Quinn Moreland [2015], Interior Scroll was premiered on
August 29, 1975, and then performed again in 1977.
15 While I agree with Davies that 4 03300 is a work of performance art, I disagree with his claim that it is also ‘a
piece of theatre’ [ibid.:460]. If his thought, in describing the piece in these two ways, is that the category theatrical
work encompasses all works of performance art, in addition to works of traditional theatre, I think that he is
wrong: while Schneemann’s Interior Scroll arguably draws on conventions of staging associated with traditional
theatre, the same is not true of Acconci’s Following Piece. Furthermore, there seems little to be gained by describ-
ing 4 03300 as ‘theatrical’: the staging conventions that it exploits are exclusively those of Western art music. David
Davies, too, briefly claims that 4 03300 is a repeatable work of performance art, rather than a work of music [2011:
215–16]. Here he follows Stephen Davies’s reasoning, which also leads him to endorse the (in my view, false)
claim that the work is a work of theatre.
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5. The Genre Question
Let us now consider what genre 4 03300 belongs to. A genre, to recapitulate, is an art kind
that groups together works according to the purpose for which they are produced and
appreciated, not according to the media with which they are created. This explains why
genres, unlike art forms, can be cross-media.
It is plausible to think that conceptual art is one such cross-media genre [Dodd
2016: sec. 6]. The characteristic purpose of conceptual artworks would seem to be that
of affording us intellectual, rather than aesthetic, interest [Goldie and Schellekens 2010:
112]. Consider, for example, Robert Barry’s Inert Gas: Helium (1969), in which the art-
ist released two cubic feet of helium into the atmosphere. This event held little, if any,
aesthetic interest. Indeed, considered as an intervention into the debate as to the nature
of artistic appreciation, this would seem to be a major part of its point. In appreciating
Barry’s work, we need only consider what he did and think through its implications for
the nature of art: specifically, by virtue of using an imperceptible material, Barry invited
us to contemplate the possibility that artworks need not possess aesthetic properties
and that the appreciation of such artworks need not involve us in a perceptual encoun-
ter with them [ibid.: 25].
Santiago Sierra’s Space Closed by Corrugated Metal (2002) works in a similar way
[ibid.: 121–3]. Notoriously, prominent members of London’s art world were invited to
the opening of the Lisson Gallery’s new extension but, on arrival, were unable to enter.
The gallery was completely boarded up by corrugated iron. After a while, Sierra himself
emerged from the building to tell the guests that this was a work of art, and he was later
quoted as saying that its point was to get its victims to experience what it is like to be
prevented from entering somewhere for politico-economic reasons: a feeling shared by
many ordinary people in Sierra’s native Argentina, following the collapse of the peso.
Once again, the details of the boarded-up gallery’s perceptual appearance are insignifi-
cant: anyone who dwelt on these features would have missed the point of the work
entirely. The work’s purpose was not aesthetic, but was broadly cognitive in nature:
namely, to bring its ‘victims’ to understand such a phenomenon of economically driven
exclusion ‘from the inside’, so to speak.
Conceptual artworks, so it seems, have a characteristic purpose of counteracting the
expectation that we should appreciate them aesthetically, and of prompting us into
considering matters of a more intellectual nature. Furthermore, as is the case with all
genres, how conceptual artworks pursue that purpose relies partly on audiences recog-
nizing that the works are produced to be appreciated in just this way. Someone who
views Duchamp’s Fountain (1917) without sharing common knowledge of its concep-
tual purpose might yet get an inkling of what is going on with this work; but she will
most likely be floored by its aesthetic nondescriptness. Only once she appreciates that
it has been exhibited for a conceptual purpose will the piece begin to work on her in
the intended fashion, pushing her into the kind of extended contemplation of the
nature of creativity in art-making that, no doubt, Duchamp playfully meant to
encourage.
So, my suggestion is that conceptual art is a genre; and one of the pleasing things
about this hypothesis is that it nicely accounts for an apparent truism about conceptual
artworks: namely, that they are ontologically diverse. Conceptual artworks can be mate-
rial objects (for example, Fountain), events (such as Inert Gas: Helium), and types of
physical particular (such as Barry’s All the things I know but of which I am not at the
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moment thinking) (1969).16 The assumption that conceptual art is a genre explains this,
precisely by acknowledging that there can be cross-media genres. Conceptual art, like
tragedy, noir, and the rest, is a genre that crosses media.
In light of this, my answer to the genre question should now be obvious: 4 03300 is a
work of conceptual art, as Davies himself occasionally suggests [S. Davies 1997: 462].
The artistic value that it possesses consists in the intellectual interest that it affords us
(that is to say, in its getting us to see that sounds are ubiquitous and can be appreciated
aesthetically as sounds). While it is true that a performance of the work, if properly
understood, will bring us to aesthetically appreciate the environmental sounds that it
frames, the work, qua silent work, is not itself appreciated aesthetically; it is ‘hear
through’ and thereby in itself aesthetically inert. In writing 4 03300, then, Cage was in the
same line of business as his friend, Duchamp, whom he first met in the 1940s.
6. Coda: Our Relationship with 4 03300
I have answered my questions. 4 03300 is a truly silent work that is both a piece of perfor-
mance art (rather than a work of music) and an example of conceptual art. I shall end
by briefly outlining how this knowledge might help audiences to understand, and hence
appreciate, the work better.
As Cage himself reports, much of the annoyance that audiences feel towards 4 03300 is
based on the assumption—no doubt, at times encouraged by Cage himself—that we
should assess the work as a work of music. Regarded as music, 4 03300 seems like a cheap
gimmick or a cheat, which thereby short-circuits audiences’ appreciation of it. How-
ever, once we assign 4 03300 to the art form performance art and to the genre conceptual
art, much of this resentment should dissipate. In this respect, it is telling that, while
scorn for avant-garde music is still rife, scorn for avant-garde art is much less well
entrenched [Ross 2010: 266–7].
Contemporary audiences are now familiar enough with conceptual art to see that
appreciating conceptual works of performance art lies in grasping their intellectual con-
ceit, not in valuing them for any aesthetic properties that they happen to have. Once
audiences regard 4 03300 in this way, they will begin to make sense of it and, in so doing,
stand more of a chance of appreciating it for the fascinating, rewarding, witty piece that
it is. This might be one of those rare occasions when a dose of philosophy cures an art-
world illness.17
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